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I. Introduction 
The manner in which a bankruptcy court determines whether a 
conveyance for future production is a transfer of real property or disguised 
financing is crucial for the oil and gas industry. This answer is crucial for 
the oil and gas industry because these commonly used business transactions 
are treated differently in bankruptcy. Depending on the court’s method, a 
bankruptcy court could treat a once-purported sale as an executory contract 
of the debtor’s estate, allowing a debtor to assume or reject the instrument 
freely under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”).1 These instruments 
tempt parties to recharacterize these transactions, depending on the 
benefited legal treatment.
2
 The need and seeming inability to distinguish 
between a purchase and a loan has led bankruptcy courts to employ 
different authorities to face this issue.
3
  
In the oil and gas industry, a bankruptcy court’s inability to uniformly 
define the interests under state law for oil and gas leases or conveyances 
                                                                                                             
 1. See United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 416 F.3d 609, 610 (7th Cir. 
2005). 
 2. Id. (“What is a ‘lease’ in federal bankruptcy law? Businesses that do not pay up 
front for assets may acquire them via unsecured debt, secured debt, or lease; in each event 
the business pays over time. Similar economic function implies the ability to draft leases that 
work like security agreements, and secured loans that work like leases.”). 
 3. Compare Redmond v. Jenkins (In re Alternate Fuels, Inc.), 789 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 
2015) (recognizing the authority under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012) for recharacterization 
purposes), with Grossman v. Lothian Oil, Inc. (In re Lothian Oil, Inc.), 650 F.3d 539, 542–
44 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding that recharacterization is appropriate under § 502(b) and 
applicable state law). 
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causes significant confusion. Under traditional oil and gas law, an oil and 
gas lease is an absolute conveyance of a fee simple determinable. Under 
bankruptcy law, an absolute conveyance is not an executory contract, which 
means it cannot be assumed or rejected under § 365 of the Code. In the 
context of federal offshore leases, this distinction becomes murkier, 
because an offshore lease is treated as a true lease and not a conveyance. 
Since federal leasing law controls, in the context of a federal offshore lease, 
the instrument may qualify as a true lease under § 365 of the Code and be 
subject to assumption or rejection.  
For a debtor to freely assume or reject an oil and gas instrument under § 
365 of the Code depends on the nature of the interest created as defined by 
state law.
4
 For example, if an oil and gas transaction conveys a real 
property interest, as opposed to a personal property interest, it will not be 
subject to assumption or rejection.
5
 A real property interest vests in the 
grantee and is a transfer of ownership. The interest is neither an executory 
contract, because it is a consummated conveyance, nor an unexpired lease, 
because of the transfer of ownership. For these reasons, courts must 
distinguish these oil and gas instruments from executory contracts and true 
leases, so the parties to the transaction retain their property interests in the 
event of bankruptcy. 
Under state law, a lessee in an oil and gas lease can carve out interests 
and convey to a grantee either a share of ownership in production in kind or 
entitlement to a share of the proceeds. In the context of state law, the 
interests carved out can be divided into two general categories: (1) 
overriding royalty interests, which take a percentage of the oil and gas 
before drilling, free from production costs; and (2) net profit interests, 
which take a percentage of the oil and gas after drilling after production 
costs, which include the costs to operate and maintain wells, equipment, 
and facilities. It is common for parties to enter into transactions where the 
lessee agrees to convey either type of interest in increments over time, and 
the counter-party agrees to pay up front for this interest to finance lessee’s 
oil and gas operations. These transactions help exploration and production 
(“E&P”) companies obtain financing for their ongoing business needs. Due 
to E&P companies’ declining access to the traditional commercial bank 
markets,
6
 there is a renewed interest in carving out interests and conveying 
                                                                                                             
 4. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). 
 5. Compare Terry Oilfield Supply Co. v. Am. Sec. Bank, N.A., 195 B.R. 66, 70-71 
(S.D. Tex. 1996), with In re J. H. Land & Cattle Co., 8 B.R. 237, 239 (W.D. Okla. 1981). 
 6. See Laura Freeman, Billions of Dollars of Bad Oil and Gas Loans, OIL & GAS FIN. 
J., Sept. 2017 at 6, 6-9 https://perma.cc/9EV8-AW29. 
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them to parties who agree to finance a lessee’s operation.7 Mainly in part 
because smaller companies are actually better suited to be more innovative 
in the way they secure investments.  
When an operator conveys an overriding royalty interest to a party 
financing the operation, and the royalty interests are limited by time, 
quantity, value, and are free from production costs, the Code protects this 
“term overriding royalty interest” from becoming property of the debtor’s 
estate in the event the operator files for bankruptcy.
8
 In other words, after 
production has begun and a producer conveys an overriding royalty that is 
limited by time, quantity, value, and free from production costs, the debtor 
should not be able to assume or reject the conveyance in order to obtain 
ownership for distribution to creditors under § 365 of the Code. However, 
other types of interests may not be protected by the Code.
9
  
The protections of this safe harbor are not automatic, and structuring the 
term overriding royalty as a conveyance of production payments as defined 
under the Code is crucial. Although “[t]here is little, if any, case law 
interpreting these provisions,” parties must be sure that their transaction is 
correctly structured so that it falls within the definition of a production 
payment or term overriding royalty interest provided in the Code.
10
 Despite 
the scant case law interpreting these provisions, companies have been 
willing to use production payments to obtain liquidity by monetizing future 
oil and gas production.
11
 Both parties enter into the transaction intending to 
make and receive an absolute conveyance of a real property interest.
12
 
However, depending on a court’s interpretation of the conveyed interest, in 
the event of bankruptcy, the debtor could reject the instrument, forcing the 
                                                                                                             
 7. See Peter J. Speer, Volumetric Production Payments—Analytical Implications and 
Adjustments for E&P Companies, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV. SPECIAL COMMENT Mar. 2006, 
at 1 https://perma.cc/8MJY-R7PF. 
 8. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(4)(B) (2012). 
 9. Cf. id. § 541 (requiring production payments—similar in concept to royalty 
interests—to be transferred by a written conveyance to an entity that does not participate in 
the production of oil and gas). 
 10. Delta Petroleum Gen. Recovery Tr. v. BWAB Ltd. Liab. Co. (In re Delta Petroleum 
Corp), Nos. 12-50877 (KJC), 2015 WL 1577990, at *17 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 2, 2015) 
(recognizing the small amount of case law for the issue that if the overriding royalty interests 
fall within the definition of “production payment” or “term overriding royalty,” they would 
be excluded from “property of the estate” pursuant to § 541(b)(4)(B) of the Code).  
 11. See James P. Benson, Private financing Alternatives for the Independent, Executive 
Report, OIL & GAS INV’R; HOUS., Spring 1994, at 11 https://perma.cc/6GNE-DBLE.  
 12. See generally William Knull, Jessica Crutcher, Kevin Shaw, ORRIs, NPIs and PPs: 
Are They What You Think They Are?, 34 OIL & GAS INV’R 10 (2014) https://perma.cc/D8GK-
U2HZ.  
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counter-party to file a claim for rejection damages and become a creditor, 
rather than a property owner. Thus, to ensure a court can identify a real 
property conveyance, parties must properly draft an instrument that will 
effectuate the intentions of the parties as measured by the documents they 
signed, the parties’ conduct, and their course of dealing.13 
Producers that can monetize large amounts of future oil and gas 
production are likely to enter into these transactions because it can be easier 
to obtain financing than traditional commercial bank markets.
14
 For 
example, producers on the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) can monetize 
future oil and gas production, which require large amounts of capital, 
making it easy to enter into transactions that convey oil and gas interests in 
return for needed funds.
15
 The OCS refers to all submerged land, its subsoil, 
and seabed that belong to the United States. These are the lands extending 
outward around the United States. The OCS regions of the Pacific coast, the 
coast of Alaska, and the Gulf of Mexico are commonly known for vast 
amounts of oil and gas production.
16
  
Production in the Gulf of Mexico will likely continue to grow in the 
future because of the yearly increase in production.
17
 Oil and gas companies 
interested in expanding to the OCS may enter into transactions to finance 
their costly operations. Therefore, understanding the implications of 
conveyances in relation to potential bankruptcy proceedings is essential to 
OCS investors. 
                                                                                                             
 13. For a further discussion examining the current state of law on debt 
recharacterization and its development, see Lawrence Ponoroff, Whither Recharacterization, 
68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1217 (2016). 
 14. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. CULP, CORPORATE AFTERSHOCK: THE PUBLIC POLICY 
LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR CORPORATIONS 183-86 
(Christopher L. Culp & William A. Niskanen eds., 2003). 
 15. See Gulf of Mexico, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR: NAT. RESOURCES REVENUE DATA, 
https://revenuedata.doi.gov/explore/offshore-gulf/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). See also 
Shuqiang Feng, Insights From Stratas Advisors: Deepwater Exploration Preserves 37 OIL & 
GAS INV’R 6 (2014). 
 16. See Pacific OCS Region, BUREAU OF OCEAN MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/Pacific-
Region/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2019); Alaska OCS Region, BUREAU OF OCEAN MGMT., 
https://www.boem.gov/Alaska-Region/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2019); Gulf of Mexico OCS 
Region, BUREAU OF OCEAN MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/Gulf-of-Mexico-Region/ (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2019). 
 17. See Jude Clemente, The Quiet Rise in U.S. Offshore Oil Production, FORBES (Apr. 
10, 2018 1:13 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2018/04/10/the-quiet-rise-in-
u-s-offshore-oil-production/#29d69c92136e. 
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However, the 2010 drilling moratorium in the Gulf of Mexico continues 
to have lasting effects on operators.
18
 Compounded with the cyclical nature 
of the industry, operators may wind up filing for bankruptcy. Parties 
investing in operations on the OCS must take the necessary steps to 
structure the transaction carefully as a true sale of a real property interest 
that will not allow the debtor to reap the benefit of assumption or rejection 
under § 365 of the Code. Thus, because it is rare for an operator and an 
investor to have completely fulfilled their obligations to the agreement, it is 
essential for parties interested in purchasing term overriding royalties or 
production payments on the OCS to structure the transaction so that the 
absolute conveyance instrument supports a true sale. 
In support of this proposal, Part II outlines the mineral estate, § 541 of 
the Code, and its applicability to oil and gas interests. Part III describes 
some issues governing the applicability of § 365 to oil and gas leases and its 
effects on a lessor’s conveyance. Part IV examines the OCS and issues that 
arise when applying both sections of the Code to conveyances of oil and 
gas interests. This comment explores an investor’s risks regarding oil and 
gas conveyances in the event of an E&P company’s bankruptcy and why 
investors should be careful when entering into transactions with E&P 
companies on the OCS. 
II. Fundamental Concepts: Property, the Mineral Estate 
 and the Bankruptcy Estate 
A. Property 
Property has a distinct meaning. Laypersons often think of property as a 
physical object of which they can obtain physical possession—a “thing” 
they can grab. However, in the legal context, property is not just a “thing.” 
Instead, property is the relationship between a person and the “thing.”19 
This relationship is known as the “property interest.”20 The relationship to 
the thing, often analogized as a “bundle of sticks” in which one or more 
parties might hold any combination of “sticks,” describes the collection of 
individual rights in the property.
21
 This analogy can also describe 
                                                                                                             
 18. See Amanda Hale, The Moratorium and the Damage Done: Offshore Drilling After 
the Gulf of Mexico Drilling Moratorium and Whether Moratoria Should Be Used, 6 LSU J. 
ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 410, 416–19 (2018). 
 19. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 5 
(3rd ed. 2000). 
 20. See id. at 7. 
 21. Id. at 3. 
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ownership in mineral property, composed of separate and individual 
property interests.
22
 For mineral property, some of the bundle of sticks 
consist of the right to develop, right to make decisions in regard to E&P, 
and, importantly, the right to receive and convey the lessee’s remaining 
share of the mineral estate.
23
 
1. The Basics of Oil and Gas Conveyancing 
A landowner traditionally owns all that lies above and below, all the way 
to heaven and all the way to hell, with certain exceptions.
24
 Generally, the 
landowner may convey “leasehold interests, mineral interests, and royalty 
interests.”25 A leasehold interest is the right to go upon the land for 
“prospecting for oil and gas [and usually other minerals also], severing and 
removing the same.”26  
The interests that may be created in oil and gas are best understood in 
relation to fee simple absolute ownership of land.
27
 A, the owner in fee 
simple absolute of Blackacre has the same rights to the minerals under the 
surface as he has to the surface.
28
 Thus, A may lease, grant, or reserve the 
totality of this subsurface interest separate from the surface. This severance 
creates the mineral estate, the most complete ownership of oil and gas 
recognized in law. B, the new owner of the mineral estate, has the same 
rights as A had previously. B, therefore, is the owner of all the minerals 
under the surface.
29
  
The mineral owner holds several rights and as a result, can sever and 
convey any or all of these interests.
30
 B, as the mineral owner, can convey a 
                                                                                                             
 22. See Monika U. Ehrman, One Oil and Gas Right to Rule Them All, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 
1063, 1064–65 (2018). 
 23. Id. 
 24. 1 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS 
LAW § 202 (Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer eds., 2018) (2018). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. § 202.1. 
 27. Id. § 301. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See generally David D. Hunt, II, Oil and Gas Title Examination: The Basics, 1 OIL 
& GAS, NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 43, 58 (2016) (describing the ownership of the 
mineral estate and the oil and gas leasehold). 
 30. See OWEN L. ANDERSON ET AL., HEMINGWAY OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION § 
9.6, at 472 (4th ed. 2004); see also Jordan D. Volino, Midstream Acreage Dedications: 
Covenants Running with the Land or a Conveyancing Confusion? 2 OIL & GAS, NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 397, 408 (2016). 
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share of either the production or the proceeds.
31
 The mineral owner can 
sever these interests into fractions and convey them to several people.
32
 
These fractional interest owners each hold their share of the mineral estate 
in its entirety.
33
 However, once an owner severs and conveys a mineral 
interest, he loses ownership and cannot convey it again because “an owner 
cannot convey more than he owns.”34 Recognizing that a mineral owner can 
convey small fractions of his interest to different parties will provide 
context for common oil and gas transactions.  
2. The Types of Interest in the Mineral Estate 
The owner of the mineral estate can convey different types of fractional 
interests. A royalty interest owner is usually entitled to payment of money 
measured by the proceeds of production. Typically, this royalty interest 
holder does not have to pay the costs of exploration or production.
35
 A 
royalty interest is commonly known as a “nonworking” interest, because 
they do not interfere with production but receive the benefit of the 
production.
36
 Royalty interest owners derive their interest from the mineral 
estate itself. The royalty interest and the mineral interest may or may not be 
shared by a joint owner. So, where a holder of a royalty interest is not also a 
holder of the associated mineral interest, they will not be involved with the 
use of the land and will only receive the benefit of production.  
An overriding royalty is much like a royalty interest but is generally 
“used to describe a royalty created from a lease that is in favor of a person 
other than the lessor.”37 In other words, the party receives what is known as 
a non-landowner royalty, not an overriding royalty. Rather, this additional 
royalty other than the royalty created in the original lease allows a lessee to 
carve and convey an overriding royalty out of his interest. So, continuing 
the example above, the owner of the mineral estate can sever and convey an 
overriding royalty interest.
38
  
Net profit interests are like overriding royalty interests. Usually, a net 
profit interest is a contractual, rather than property, right to receive an 
                                                                                                             
 31. 1 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 24, § 301.  
 32. Id. 
 33. See ANDERSON, supra note 30, § 9.8, at 481. 
 34. Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 103 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. 
Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d 369, 377 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006), rev'd, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 
2008). 
 35. 1 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 24, § 202.3. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. 
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amount of money from production measured by a contractual formula. Net 
profit interests are only payable to the net profit interest holder after the 
mineral owner profits from production in excess of the formulaic amount 
during the contractually agreed-upon period.
39
 A true net profit interest is 
not an absolute conveyance. However, it is possible to create an absolute 
conveyance of a net profit interest for a term of years or measured by 
money, which can begin to look like a production payment discussed 
below. The more the net profit interest looks like a production payment, the 
more it resembles an absolute conveyance. Still, these interests are only 
payable after productions costs have been satisfied.
40
 
Production payments, known as term overriding royalty interests, oil 
payments,
41
 and volumetric production payments (collectively “Production 
Payments”),42 are also similar to an overriding royalty interest. This interest 
is a fractional interest “carved out” from the lessee’s interest, the working 
interest, “which is a share of the minerals produced from described 
premises, free of the costs of production at the surface.”43 A mineral 
owner’s conveyance of a Production Payment ends when the agreed-upon 
“volume of production has been paid over or when a specified sum from the 
sale of such oil” has been realized.44 Production Payments are common 
when an investor purchases some of the mineral interest in order to finance 
an E&P company’s operations. For example, a mineral owner may use 
Production Payments for debts owed to lenders or investors. An investor 
can also use Production Payments to obtain a return on capital provided to 
the operator.
45
 Once the Production Payment holder has received their 
portion of production, the interest terminates.
46
 
The difference between a Production Payment and an overriding royalty 
interests is that a Production Payment is “limited to the time required for 
the stated number of units of production or the sum specified in the 
instrument creating the oil payment.”47 An overriding royalty will normally 
have “the same duration as the working interest out of which it was 
                                                                                                             
 39. See id. § 424.1. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. § 422. 
 42. See, e.g., McCall v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 509 F. App'x 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 43. QEP Energy Co. v. Sullivan, 444 F. App’x. 284, 289 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 44. 2 PATRICK H. MARTIN AND BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS 
LAW § 422 (LexisNexis Mathew Bender 2018) (footnote omitted). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. § 422.3. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
50 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
  
 
created.”48 Therefore, E&P companies have more freedom and liquidity 
with Production Payments because an interest holder can convey 
Production Payments frequently and to many different parties. Although a 
Production Payment relationship is advantageous in some respects, some 
courts have suggested the transaction creates a debtor-creditor 
relationship.
49
 However, commentators believe this is erroneous.
50
 The 
differing analyses have resulted in divergent state law approaches as 
bankruptcy courts apply applicable state law to determine the debtor-
creditor relationship. 
B. Bankruptcy 
The Code explicitly adopts the legal definition of property.
51
 The instant 
a person files bankruptcy, an “estate” is created, which consists of “all legal 
or equitable interest of the debtor in property.”52 The interests in “property” 
the debtor holds, i.e., whichever stick he holds, is brought into the estate 
and is known as property of the estate.
53
 As a result, whatever interest in 
property the debtor holds as of the date of filing will become property of the 
estate.
54
  
1. Property of the Estate and the Types of Interests in the Mineral Estate 
The concept of “property of the estate” in a bankruptcy case is important 
because it “establishes the ‘what’ in the core question of ‘who gets what’ in 
the bankruptcy distribution.”55 State law limits whether the debtor holds an 
interest in property and the analysis of that interest will differ from state to 
state.
56
 The Code’s “property of the estate” is applied in broad strokes in an 
attempt to capture every imaginable interest.
57
 For this reason, the debtor 
                                                                                                             
 48. Id. 
 49. E.g., PSI, Inc. of Mo. v. Aguillard (In re Senior-G & A Operating Co.), 957 F.2d 
1290, 1297 (5th Cir. 1992); Posey v. Fargo, 174 So. 175, 180 (La. 1937).  
 50. 2 MARTIN, supra note 44, § 422.2 (“An occasional case, erroneously we believe, has 
said that the relationship created by an oil payment is that of debtor and creditor.”). 
 51. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012). 
 52. Id. § 541(a)(1). 
 53. Id. § 541(a) 
 54. Id. 
 55. CHARLES J. TABB, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY, 415 (4th ed. 2016) (“The Code embodies a 
strong congressional policy favoring maximization of the size of the estate so that creditors 
may be paid as much as possible on their claims.”). 
 56. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10 (1924). 
 57. See TABB, supra, note 55 at 396. 
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and his creditors, the “who,”58 will try to capture every conceivable interest 
the debtor may hold, so property owned by the debtor becomes “property of 
the estate” and there is more to distribute to creditors in the bankruptcy 
case.
59
 Parties who arguably already own property interests formerly 
belonging to the debtor will attempt to keep their interest severed to prevent 
the interest from becoming property of the estate.  
That said, just as the Code defines what becomes “property of the 
estate,” it also defines what “property of the estate does not include.”60 The 
Code provides a “safe harbor” for certain kinds of oil and gas interests.61 
Section 541(b)(4)(B) of the Code provides that the assignee of a Production 
Payment takes title to the interest and that interest will not become property 
of the estate if the assignor files for bankruptcy.
62
 The Code defines the 
term “production payment” as a “term overriding royalty satisfiable in cash 
or in kind” that is “(A) contingent on the production of liquid or gaseous 
hydrocarbon from particular real property; and (B) from a specified 
volume, or specified value, from the liquid or gaseous hydrocarbon 
produced from such property.”63 The Code also defines a “term overriding 
royalty” as “an interest in liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons in place or to be 
produced from particular real property that entitles the owner thereof to a 
share of production, or the value thereof, for a term limited by time, 
quantity, or value realized.”64 In simpler terms, when the debtor conveys 
Production Payments to a party, these interests will not become property of 
the estate.  
This interpretation is consistent with the section’s legislative history, 
which reveals that Congress did not intend to permit a “conveyance of a 
production payment or an oil and gas lease to be recharacterized in a 
bankruptcy context as a contractual interest subject to rejection under 
                                                                                                             
 58. The estate representative (i.e., the trustee or the debtor in possession) acts under 
provisions of the Code to benefit the debtor’s estate, which ultimately benefits the debtor’s 
creditors upon distribution. Koch Ref. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339, 
1348 (7th Cir. 1987) (“It is axiomatic that the trustee has the right to bring any action in 
which the debtor has an interest.”). 
 59. See e.g., Abele v. Phoenix Suns Ltd. (In re Harrell), 73 F.3d 218, 219 (9th Cir. 
1996) (rejecting the argument that debtor’s ability to renew Phoenix Suns season tickets was 
property under Arizona state law as such an opportunity is a mere expectancy). 
 60. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b) (2012). 
 61. Id. § 541(b)(4)(B) (amended in 1994 to exclude oil and gas interest from property of 
the estate). 
 62. Id. § 541(b)(4)(B). 
 63. 11 U.S.C. § 101(42A) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. § 101(56A) (emphasis added). 
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section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.”65 Section 541(b)(4)(B)’s safe harbor 
provides that “any interest of the debtor in liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons 
to the extent” that the debtor has “transferred such interest pursuant to a 
written conveyance of a production payment to an entity that does not 
participate in the operation . . . the estate could include the interest . . . only 
by virtue of section 365 or 542 of this title.”66 Thus, Production Payments 
will not become “property of the estate” if the transferee can demonstrate 
(1) the existence of a transfer of the “production payment” pursuant to a 
written conveyance; (2) the grantee does not participate in the operations; 
and (3) the debtor could only include Production Payments into the 
bankruptcy estate by virtue of other sections of the Code.
67
 
III. Issues in § 365 of the Code 
Section 365 of the Code provides that a trustee or debtor in possession 
“may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the 
debtor.”68 This power is broad and allows the debtor to choose which 
instruments to assume and reject since “burdensome obligations can impede 
a successful reorganization.”69 A debtor can assume favorable executory 
contracts and unexpired leases, so the debtor can benefit from them 
throughout reorganization.
70
 Section 365 of the Code is a valuable tool that 
benefits the debtor’s estate in bankruptcy.71 Although § 365 of the Code has 
nothing to do with a debtor-creditor relationship, if the debtor rejects a § 
365 executory contract, then the counter-party has the right to file a claim 
for rejection damages, eventually becoming a creditor of the estate, if 
successful.  
Determining whether § 365 of the Code applies to an oil and gas 
transaction presents troubles in its application, because state law ultimately 
decides whether a debtor can assume or reject an instrument that was 
originally intended to convey fee simple rights. Thus, the important point 
for § 365 of the Code is to determine if the relevant interest is an absolute 
                                                                                                             
 65. 140 CONG. REC. E2204-01 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1994) (statement by Rep. Brooks). 
 66. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(4)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 67. Id. 
 68. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). 
 69. Century Indem. Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co. Settlement Tr. (In re Nat’l Gypsum Co.), 
208 F.3d 498, 504 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 
(1984)). 
 70. Carlisle Homes, Inc. v. Azzari (In re Carlisle Homes, Inc.), 103 B.R. 524, 534 
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1988). 
 71. See id. 
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conveyance of a property interest. If so, then the interest is outside the 
scope of § 365. 
A. Executory Contracts v. Unexpired Leases 
In the context of bankruptcy, the ability to assume or reject an oil and gas 
lease and the resulting applicability of § 365 of the Code depends on the 
nature of the interest as determined by state law.
72
 In bankruptcy, the use of 
specific terms within a conveyance does not automatically render the 
property interest therein as real property, the primary consideration a court 
will use to determine whether an interest passes into the debtor’s estate. If 
state law characterizes the conveyed interest as a real property interest, then 
the debtor cannot assume or reject the instrument because it is a true sale of 
ownership and not a “true lease,” as the legislative intent suggests.73 
As sales of real property are not typically undertaken through an 
executory contract or a lease, the determination of an absolute conveyance 
has important implications in a bankruptcy proceeding. A debtor that can 
assume or reject an instrument under § 365 of the Code has substantial 
power to assume beneficial contracts or reject burdensome leases. 
However, if the instrument cannot be assumed or rejected, then the parties 
retain all obligations, burdens, and benefits under the instrument.  
1. What is an Executory Contract? 
An executory contract is one where failure to perform the ongoing 
obligations on both sides must be such that a failure to perform those 
continuing obligations would constitute a material breach of the contract.
74
 
If an instrument before a bankruptcy court is an executory contract, then § 
365 of the Code governs, and the debtor may assume or reject the interest. 
The Code does not define the term executory contract but generally 
includes contracts where there are material unperformed obligations on 
both sides; executory contracts can cover various types of transactions.
75
 
Most transactions will involve some type of executory contract. For 
example, a purchase and sale agreement is an executory contract. Other 
similar agreements can also be executory contracts. Although a sale of a 
                                                                                                             
 72. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979). 
 73. See In re Clark Res., Inc., 68 B.R. 358, 359 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986) (noting the 
Bankruptcy Amendment and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 intended to remedy § 365 of the 
Code when applied to commercial leases and not necessarily oil and gas leases). 
 74. E.g., id.  
 75. See Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re Univ. Med. Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1075 n.13 
(3d Cir. 1992) (noting an agreement to provide medical services to be executory). 
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term overriding royalty interest as defined under the Code may look like an 
executory contract, a debtor cannot assume or reject the instrument if § 
541(b)’s safe harbor applies. However, as discussed infra, if § 541(b) does 
not apply, the debtor may assume or reject the instrument by virtue of § 365 
of the Code. 
2. What is an Unexpired Lease? 
A debtor can only assume true leases under § 365 of the Code. As the 
Code does not define an unexpired lease, courts will apply state law.
76
 
Courts look behind the label of the instrument to decide its true character.
77
 
For example, a true lease is one where the landlord turns over possession to 
the tenant in exchange for rental payments and provides the lessee a simple 
possessory interest, rather than ownership. 
Bankruptcy courts have used § 365 of the Code to recharacterize a 
purported lease as disguised financing arrangements by sheer vigilance.
78
 
These courts resolve whether a transaction was a disguised financing 
instrument by applying state law.
79
 In adopting the Code, Congress 
intended for courts to examine the true substance of the transaction on a 
case-by-case basis to discover if a lease is a true lease or a financing 
instrument.
80
 The legislative history states that “the fact that the lessee 
assumes and discharges substantially all the risks and obligations ordinarily 
attributed to the outright ownership of the property is more indicative of a 
financing transaction than of a true lease.”81 Thus, courts scrutinize leases 
for substance over form to determine if the lessee has more than just a 
possessory interest and is, in fact, an owner.
82
 
3. How Are They Similar and How Are They Different? 
At first glance, the similarity between executory contracts and unexpired 
leases may be apparent. First, both parties still have certain obligations to 
                                                                                                             
 76. River Prod. Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 739 n.17 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(“While we interpret the Bankruptcy Code as a matter of federal law, state law determines 
whether these contracts constitute unexpired leases subject to Section 365.”). 
 77. See United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 416 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 
2005). 
 78. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.02[3] (16th ed. 2013). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 64 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5850 
(“Whether a ‘lease’ is a true or bona fide lease or, in the alternative, a financing ‘lease’ or a 
lease intended as security, depends upon the circumstances of each case.”). 
 81. Id. (emphasis added).  
 82. See United Airlines, Inc., 416 F.3d at 612. 
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perform. Second, both are a type of agreement to perform obligations 
within a certain time period. However, scrutinizing these instruments show 
their differences.  
An instrument may not be an executory contract if the only remaining 
performance to be rendered is a payment of money.
83
 In contrast, if the 
remaining performance is a payment of money, the conveyance may be 
deemed an unexpired lease if the lessee has a possessory interest and the 
lessor is the owner.
84
 Some bankruptcy courts may consider transactions 
over drilling rights for oil and gas as unexpired leases of real property if 
drilling never occurred because the agreement was a right to use the real 
property, not own it.
85
 
Considering whether there has been an effective and consummated 
conveyance under state law is the key to determining if an instrument is an 
executory contract in bankruptcy. However, if an instrument is neither an 
executory contract nor an unexpired lease, then § 365 of the Code will not 
apply at all.
86
  
B. The Applicability of § 365 to Oil and Gas Leases 
The reliance of bankruptcy courts on respective state laws to establish 
the classification of the rights in an instrument, creates disparate results. 
The initial question to consider before considering conveyances of 
Production Payments is what an oil and gas lease is. At its core, the oil and 
gas lease represents an owner selling his interest to someone that will 
remove oil and gas in the future. In the context of state law, the execution 
of an oil and gas lease removes some of the lessor’s sticks in the bundle, 
such as the “right to possess, use, or dispose of the oil and gas in, upon or 
under the land in question,” and vests them in the lessee.87 In other words, 
the lessor is giving ownership of the oil and gas to the lessee.  
Some states have recognized that an oil and gas lease grants an 
ownership interest in the oil and gas.
88
 In these cases, such a lease is a “sale 
                                                                                                             
 83. See Magdovitz Family Tr. v. KY USA Energy, Inc. (In re KY USA Energy, Inc.), 
449 B.R. 745, 750 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2011). 
 84. See, e.g., In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 306 B.R. 43, 82 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 85. See In re Gasoil, Inc., 59 B.R. 804, 806 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986). 
 86. See In re KY USA Energy, Inc., 449 B.R. at 748; see also United Airlines, Inc. v. 
HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 416 F.3d 609, 610 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 87. Wayne C. Byers & Timothy N. Tuggey, Oil and Gas Leases and Section 365 of the 
Bankruptcy Code: A Uniform Approach, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 337, 339 (1989) (citing Texas 
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (citation omitted)). 
 88. Id. 
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of a fee interest in the oil and gas in place.”89 As such, some states 
acknowledge “[t]he term ‘lease,’ when used in an oil and gas context, is a 
misnomer.”90 Instead, “[t]he common oil and gas lease creates a 
determinable fee. It vests the lessee with title to oil and gas.”91 The “rules 
applicable to ordinary tenancies” do not apply, because these leases do not 
create the ordinary landlord-tenant relationship that grants a lessee a 
possessory interest rather than ownership.
92
 In other words, in these states, 
an oil and gas lease can best be described as a conveyance of ownership 
rights with a reversionary interest in the remaining mineral estate after the 
producer has extracted oil and gas. 
The conveyance in oil and gas leases is distinct from an ordinary lease. 
Although the conveyance vests the lessee with ownership in the minerals, in 
the bankruptcy context, it often appears to be an executory contract or an 
unexpired lease, invoking § 365 of the Code. Although the lessee returns 
the property to the lessor after he has removed the oil and gas that has been 
conveyed to him, the transaction seems to be both a true sale and an 
instrument that fits under § 365 of the Code. The nature of the reversionary 
interest has confused some bankruptcy courts, despite the conveyance of a 
real property interest.
93
 Under state law, some oil and gas leases convey 
ownership with a reversionary interest, but oil and gas leases have disparate 
interpretations in bankruptcy when applying § 365 of the Code.
94
  
The Fifth Circuit has recognized § 365 of the Code’s applicability to this 
distinction.
95
 It noted that “oil and gas leases considered to be freehold 
estates by the governing state law do not constitute ‘unexpired leases’ under 
the Code and therefore Section 365 does not govern their assumption or 
rejection.”96 For example, the court noted, “[i]n Oklahoma, oil and gas 
leases are not unexpired leases of real property subject to assumption or 
                                                                                                             
 89. Id. 
 90. Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. 1982). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Phillip G. Whaley, Bankruptcy: Is § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code Applicable to 
Oklahoma Oil and Gas Leases?, 40 OKLA. L. REV. 99, 105 (1987). 
 93. See generally Mark W. Wege, Oscar N. Pinkas & Lauren Macksoud, Does the 
Second Circuit in Sabine Have the Final Word on Texas Law? 37-AUG AM. BANKR. INST. J. 
24, 78 (discussing a court’s decision holding gathering agreements as executory contracts 
allowing the debtor to reject the gathering agreements). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See River Prod. Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 739 n.17 (5th Cir. 
1990). 
 96. Id. 
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rejection.”97 However, when there is a reversionary, and therefore 
leasehold, interest “Section 365 does govern their disposition.”98  
An “unexpired true lease” and an “executory contract” differ from each 
other but courts use the terms executory contract and unexpired lease 
interchangeably when applying them to oil and gas leases. Generally, courts 
understand an executory contract to mean an instrument where both the 
debtor and the counter-party have sufficient remaining obligations that 
nonperformance would not constitute a material breach, and a “true lease” 
varies across jurisdictions.
99
 Since the Code fails to define either term, 
“courts apply nonbankruptcy state and federal law to determine the nature 
of the interest for the purposes of assumption or rejection.”100 Therefore, the 
different approaches by bankruptcy courts in determining whether an oil 
and gas lease is a true lease or an executory contract is relevant to § 365’s 
applicability when applied to conveyances of Production Payments because 
courts will follow the same approach. 
1. Oil and Gas Leases as Executory Contracts? 
Whether the oil and gas lease qualifies as an executory contract depends 
on different factors. If an oil and gas lease can be an executory contract, 
then it problematically “ignores the fundamental principles of executory 
contract theory and the substantive nature of the rights created by an oil and 
gas lease.”101  
In states where there is a conveyance of ownership rights in real 
property, an oil and gas lease can never be executory because both sides 
have materially performed their obligations with respect to the conveyance. 
If there is an absolute conveyance of a property interest, then it is not an 
executory contract and cannot be rejected under § 365 of the Code. 
Although there is plenty to be done by the lessee, such as operations, these 
operations do not have to be done in order for the conveyance to be 
effective. So whether an oil and gas lease is within reach of § 365 
ultimately depends on whether the oil and gas lease conveys a real property 
interest.  
Whether parties to an oil and gas lease have performance due on both 
sides depends on the terms of the oil and gas lease. It is uncommon for an 
                                                                                                             
 97. Id. (citing In re Clark Res. Inc., 68 B.R. 358 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Camisha L. Simmons, Is That Exploration and Production Lease Really a 
Lease?, 37-DEC AM. BANKR. INST. J. 50, 50 (2018). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Byers & Tuggey, supra note 87, at 352. 
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oil and gas lease to be executory because neither party has unperformed 
material obligations. The oil and gas lease is an absolute and consummated 
conveyance. Thus, nothing is left for an effective conveyance. For example, 
once there has been an effective conveyance, the lessee must commence 
drilling operations. The lessor has no further obligations, and the lessee’s 
sole remaining obligation is to make royalty payments to the lessor(s).
102
 
However, it is crucial to recognize that the operations or royalty payments 
do not have to be performed in order for the conveyance to be effective. For 
this reason, an oil and gas lease is not executory. Naturally, if operations are 
not commenced or continued within the negotiated primary term, then the 
mineral estate will revert to the lessor, but this reversion is unrelated to 
whether the original conveyance was effective. 
Nonetheless, a leading commentator has described an oil and gas lease as 
always being executory in nature.
103
 Professor Kuntz has recognized the 
lessor-lessee relationship as an “executory contract in that it contains 
elaborate contractual provisions which continue in force between the lessor 
and the lessee during the life of the interest granted”104 This argument is 
“even more compelling if the lessor is still in a position to breach the 
lease.”105 Thus, an oil and gas lease may appear to fit into the definition of 
an executory contract. 
Despite this argument, the legislative history of § 365 of the Code might 
provide a more applicable definition for conveyances of oil and gas 
interests.
106
 The legislative history provides that while “there is no precise 
definition of what contracts are executory, it generally includes contracts on 
which performance is due to some extent on both sides.”107 Some courts 
accept this as the definition of an executory contract.
108
 However, the 
competing theories of Professor Kuntz’s definition and the traditional 
definition of an executory contract in § 365’s legislative history causes 
different results.  
For example, if an oil and gas lease contains agreements to discover and 
produce gas, and parties have not commenced these obligations, a court 
may conclude that the lease is an executory contract; had lessees complied 
                                                                                                             
 102. See Whaley, supra note 92, at 103. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Byers & Tuggey, supra note 87, at 343. 
 107. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 58 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5844; See 
id. 
 108. Byers & Tuggey, supra note 87, at 344, n.29. 
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and discovered gas, the property interest, the gas, would have vested in the 
lessee.
109
 On review of In re Powell, however, an appellate opinion vacated 
and remanded the bankruptcy’s courts legal conclusion that the oil and gas 
lease is an executory contract or unexpired lease.
110
 Thus, the issue of 
whether the oil and gas lease creates an executory contract seemingly 
turned on whether there was a conveyance of, or an agreement to use, 
certain property that would then vest after the party satisfied their 
obligation.
111
 
The different definitions from Professor Kuntz and the legislative history 
can lead courts to contradictory results for this one instrument. However, is 
it reasonable that the continued payment of specified royalties is enough to 
characterize an oil and gas lease as an executory contract because the 
payment of royalties constitute an ongoing obligation? According to the 
Code,
112
 once the lessee conveys the interest in the oil and gas lease, it will 
vest in the lessee.
113
 The correct analysis thus provides that an oil and gas 
lease could never be executory, because if there is an absolute conveyance 
that is effective and consummated, as there is in an oil and gas lease, then it 
is not executory.
114
  
2. Oil and Gas Leases as Unexpired Leases? 
Individuals familiar with an oil and gas lease know that it is not an 
ordinary lease. As discussed above, the term “‘oil and gas lease’ is a 
misnomer because the interest created by an oil and gas lease is not the 
same interest created by a lease under landlord and tenant law.”115 
Nonetheless, this instrument may constitute an unexpired lease under § 365 
of the Code depending on how state law treats the mineral estate.
116
 
In states where the fee simple owner of the mineral estate severs and 
divests the mineral estate through an oil and gas lease, the owner makes a 
                                                                                                             
 109. Powell v. Anadarko E&P Co. (In re Powell), 482 B.R. 873, 877–78 (Bankr. M.D. 
Pa. 2012), vacated in part, 2015 WL 6964549. 
 110. Chesapeake Appalachia LLC v. Powell (In re Powell), 2015 WL 6964549, at *8 
(M.D. Pa. 2015). A party will appeal a bankruptcy court’s finding to the district court.  
 111. See id. 
 112. 11 U.S.C. § 101(56A) (2012). 
 113. See Tennant v. Dunn, 110 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex. 1937). 
 114. Id. 
 115. River Prod. Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 740 n.17 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 116. See id. 
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conveyance of a real property interest.
117
 If an oil and gas lease were an 
unexpired lease, and a debtor could apply § 365 of the Code, the result 
would be “quite simply an exaltation of form over substance.”118 The lessee 
would have ownership if he complies with the lease. For example, 
bankruptcy courts applying Texas state law have established that an oil and 
gas lease is not a true lease but instead is a transaction that conveys a real 
property interest.
119
 As a result, under Texas law, an oil and gas lease is not 
an unexpired lease; if the debtor is a lessor, then he is not an owner. He may 
not assume the lease into the bankruptcy estate, and the lessee retains his 
ownership interest.
120
 
Bankruptcy courts have reached a similar conclusion when applying 
Oklahoma law.
121
 The specific legal right transferred under an oil and gas 
lease in Oklahoma is something more than an “incorporeal hereditament or 
a profit à prendre.”122 The interest is one in land and grants the lessee the 
rights to explore and remove something from the land to the lessee’s 
benefit.
123
 As a result, under Oklahoma law, an oil and gas lease is not an 
unexpired lease because an oil and gas lease is termed as a qualified fee 
simple, not a true lease.
124
  
Federal law governing oil and gas leases is also inconsistent. The Tenth 
Circuit noted “where no right of the federal government is involved, state 
law governs,” and federal courts will look to state law to decide the nature 
of the onshore oil and gas lease interest.
125
 In Bolack, the Tenth Circuit 
applied state law to hold that the interest in a federal onshore oil and gas 
lease was real property.
126
 Thus, if applicable state law established the 
interests were real property interests, making the lessee the owner of the 
mineral estate, a bankruptcy court would likely find that a federal onshore 
                                                                                                             
 117. See, e.g., Terry Oilfield Supply Co. v. Am. Sec. Bank, N.A., 195 B.R. 66, 70 (S.D. 
Tex. 1996) (finding that a debtor cannot assume or reject a mineral lease since it conveys 
real property). 
 118. Byers & Tuggey, supra note 87, at 353. 
 119. Terry Oilfield Supply Co., 195 B.R. at 70. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Compare In re Clark Res., Inc., 68 B.R. 358, 359 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986) with 
Shields v. Moffitt, 984 OK 42, ¶¶ 10–13, 683 P.2d 530, 532. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Shields v. Moffitt, 1984 OK 42, ¶¶ 10–13, 683 P.2d 530, 532. 
 125. Bolack v. Underwood, 340 F.2d 816, 819–20 (10th Cir. 1965). 
 126. Id. 
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oil and gas lease would not be subject to assumption or rejection under § 
365 of the Code.
127
 
Determining property interests is also complicated for federal offshore 
oil and gas leases. The United States has asserted that an OCS lease is a true 
lease of real property because it is a rental agreement to use real property 
and does not give the lessee ownership rights in the mineral estate.
128
 The 
United States asserted that the OCS leases were also executory contracts 
because the lessee must continue to make royalty and rental payments and 
the United States must provide the lands for development and supervise 
development.
129
 For these reasons, the United States argued that the oil and 
gas leases are within reach of § 365 of the Code.
130
 That said, bankruptcy 
courts have yet to resolve how to classify offshore oil and gas leases.
131
 
IV. How the Applicability of the Code Will Affect Production on the OCS 
A. What is the OCS? 
The United States regulates the OCS through the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act (“OCSLA”).132 The OCS is comprised of the submerged lands 
three miles offshore from state coastlines.
133
 The OCS consists of 1.7 
billion acres divided into four regions of submerged lands, subsoil, and 
seabed: the Gulf of Mexico, Atlantic, Pacific, and Alaska regions.
134
 In 
January 2017, the Federal Gulf of Mexico contributed 1.7 million barrels 
per day and accounted for the highest annual average of crude oil 
production to date due to new projects and increased production.
135
 As new 
projects continue to be planned and approved, production will likely 
                                                                                                             
 127. See id. 
 128. See, e.g., NGP Capital Res. Co. v. ATP Oil & Gas Corp. (In re ATP Oil & Gas 
Corp.), No.12-03443, 2014 WL 61408 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2014). 
 129. See, e.g., id. 
 130. See NGP Capital Resources Co.'s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment Against ATP 
Oil & Gas Corp. at 9, NGP Capital Res. Co. v. ATP Oil & Gas Corp. (In re ATP Oil & Gas 
Corp.), No.12-03443, 2014 WL 61408 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2014) (No. 12-36187). 
 131. Camisha L. Simmons, Offshore Oil and Gas Leases: The Unanswered Question, 36-
SEP AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 19 (2017). 
 132. 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
 133. Id. § 1301(a). 
 134. The Continental Shelf, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
https://www.boem.gov/The-Continental-Shelf/ (last visited Jan, 18, 2019). 
 135. Gulf of Mexico crude oil production, already at annual high, expected to keep 
increasing, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TODAY IN ENERGY (Apr. 12, 2017), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=30752. 
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continue to increase and operators will likely consider production on the 
OCS and use the associated capital to fund their projects. The vast 
quantities of production available give operators the ability to monetize 
future production to obtain capital for projects.
136
 Therefore, E&P 
companies will be attracted to produce on the OCS and consider monetizing 
future oil and gas production in order to expand and continue projects. 
B. What is the OCSLA? 
OCSLA recognized the OCS as a “vital national resource reserve held by 
the Federal Government for the public, which should be made available for 
expeditious and orderly development.”137 Specifically, OSCLA asserted 
that the OCS “appertain[s] to the United States.”138 The intentional use of 
the curious phrase “appertain to,” rather than “owned by,” still declares that 
the OCS is subject to the United States’ jurisdiction, control, and power of 
dispositions, implying that the United States Federal Government is the 
owner of the OCS.
139
  
Before the enactment of OCSLA, there was a significant dispute between 
the federal government and certain coastal states regarding the ownership of 
the OCS.
140
 The United States sued California, Louisiana, and Texas,
141
 
arguing that the federal government’s rights over the continental shelf were 
“paramount over the rights of all three states.”142 In response to the three 
cases, Congress enacted OCSLA and the Submerged Lands Act.
143
  
OCSLA authorizes the federal government to lease OCS lands to private 
companies for E&P.
144
 The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
(“BOEM”) and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 
(“BSEE”) are in charge of leasing and regulating OCS lands.145 OCS leases 
                                                                                                             
 136. Lauren Hunt Brogdon, Note, A New Horizon?: The Need for Improved Regulation 
of Deepwater Drilling, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 291, 294 (2012). 
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function similarly to a traditional oil and gas lease.
146
 The United States 
receives profits in royalty and rental payments by leasing the rights to 
explore and drill for minerals to private developers.
147
 
Operators are likely to consider production on the OCS because of its 
rise in crude oil production.
148
 However, because of the continuing rise in 
bankruptcies proceedings, some involving oil and gas producers, and the 
general nature of the oil and gas industry, companies that engage in 
offshore E&P might seek capital from investors by offering Production 
Payments due to the guaranteed capital and secured financing.
149
 
1. OCSLA’s Choice of Law Provision 
Because bankruptcy applies state law, operators interested in capitalizing 
the OCS should pay particular attention to the choice of law scheme. The 
choice of law provision in OCSLA is a “densely worded” and important 
provision that decides what law applies.
150
 Section 1333(a)(2)(A) adopts as 
surrogate federal law “the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State” as 
long as they are “not inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal 
laws and regulations of the Secretary.”151 The adjacent state’s law applies to 
the subsoil, the seabed, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected 
thereon.
152
 The OCSLA considers a state adjacent if such areas, islands, or 
structures “would be within the area of the state if its boundaries were 
extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf.”153 
For example, offshore oil and gas contracts may include choice-of-law 
provisions where the parties agree that the law of a particular state will 
govern the interpretation and enforceability of their contract.
154
 However, if 
OCSLA governs the contract, a bankruptcy court would apply the law of 
the adjacent state according to the federal statute and ignore the parties’ 
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choice of law provision.
155
 The law of the adjacent state would then govern 
§ 365’s applicability to the oil and gas interests. Therefore, despite stating 
an axiomatic point, it is essential to know which state’s law governs and the 
associated law of that state and its property rights.  
C. Production Payments on the OCS 
As discussed earlier, for § 541(b)(4)(B) of the Code—regarding the 
analysis of Production Payment instruments as conveyances of real 
property—to apply and protect these interests in the event of bankruptcy, 
the debtor must show that (1) there was a transfer of the “production 
payment” pursuant to a written conveyance; (2) the grantee does not 
participate in production operations; and (3) other provisions of the Code, 
such as § 365, do not include the interest into the debtor’s estate.156 If a 
debtor meets these three elements, the Production Payments do not become 
property of the estate. 
Similar to an oil and gas lease between a private surface owner and a 
business entity, the United States government only leases to individuals, 
corporations, and partnerships who are qualified to be an assignee of an 
OCS lease.
157
 A leaseholder can assign its interest with BOEM approval.
158
 
However, this restriction only concerns the land, not anything an operator 
produces, such as oil and gas.
159
 With conveyances, Production Payments, 
and similar “carved out” interests, the BOEM only requires a filing to have 
the transaction on record.
160
 These non-required filings do not require 
approval.
161
 As a result, the lessee in the OCS has the freedom to negotiate 
and enter into transactions with respect to oil and gas interests.  
The transaction for a Production Payment consists of three documents: 
“[(1)] a Purchase and Sale Agreement, [(2)] a Conveyance of Overriding 
Royalty, and [(3)] a Production and Delivery Agreement.”162 First, the 
purchase and sale agreement states the terms and conditions of the transfer 
that will govern the transfer of production from the grantor to the grantee. 
Second, the conveyance of the Production Payment addresses the transfer 
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 157. See 30 C.F.R. § 556.402 (2016). 
 158. Getting It Right the First Time, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT. (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://www.boem.gov/2017-NALTA-Presentation/.  
 159. See id. 
 160. 30 C.F.R. § 556.715 (2016). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Jeffrey S. Muñoz, Financing of Oil and Gas Transactions, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS & 
ENERGY L. 223, 230 (2009). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss1/3
2019]    Rethinking Private Equity-Backed Oil & Gas Transactions 65 
 
 
of what the operator will produce and what adjustments might be necessary 
to make up for shortages. Finally, the production and delivery agreement 
covers issues of marketing, gathering and transportation, and processing. 
These documents allow the grantor and grantee the opportunity to mitigate 
risks in the transaction.
163
 They also ensure there is a successful transaction 
between the parties.
164
 This type of purchase and sale agreement is a 
common and properly structured conveyance of Production Payments.
165
 
1. Is it a Transfer? 
Bankruptcy courts could recharacterize the instrument because it is not a 
transfer of a Production Payment under a written conveyance. Analyzing 
the definition of a Production Payment under the Code presents issues. The 
Code defines the term “production payment” in two subparts.166 First, the 
Production Payment or “term overriding royalty” is “contingent on the 
production of a liquid or gaseous hydrocarbon from particular real 
property.”167 Second, the “term overriding royalty” must be “from a 
specified volume, or a specified value, from the liquid or gaseous 
hydrocarbon produced from such property and determined without regard 
to production costs.”168 The Code further defines the term “term overriding 
royalty” as “an interest in liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons in place or to be 
produced from particular real property that entitles the owner thereof to a 
share of production.”169  
The Code’s definitions for a Production Payment suggests that payments 
should be produced from the real property.
170
 The provision may allow a 
producer to deliver regular shortfalls later with interest, as long as the 
Production Payment or term overriding royalty is still produced from the 
“real property.”171 For example, if a provision in the instrument allows the 
producer to make up missed Production Payments or term overriding 
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royalties from the previous term, it is possible the transaction will not be at 
risk of recharacterization if they are still from “such property.”172  
In contrast, if an operator substitutes missed Production Payments from 
other property not described in the instrument that produces oil and gas, 
then it may not meet the first element of a transfer. If there was a provision 
in the instrument that would force the grantor to substitute missed 
payments, it would likely still be a transfer. However, if the provision 
places a substantial penalty to ensure delivery and allows substituted 
Production Payments from other properties, it moves away from the Code’s 
definition of a transfer from “such property” and risks being possibly 
recharacterized as a loan.
173
 In any event, classification and treatment will 
remain unsolved absent judicial guidance.  
Although a provision that motivates or penalizes shortfalls in production 
but allows the grantor to make up these shortfalls may risk being 
recharacterized, parties must consider the context of the oil and industry. 
The volatility and continued exploration for production may increase a 
company’s ability to make up shortfalls on the OCS rather than onshore. A 
producer can make up shortfalls on the OCS because of the potential of vast 
future production, but a lessor in a state without such production 
capabilities will have trouble making up deficits.  
The use of technical terms or descriptive titles is not determinative of 
whether the conveyance of Production Payments is a transfer or a disguised 
financing transaction.
174
 Bankruptcy courts have held that “substance will 
not give way to form, that technical considerations will not prevent 
substantial justice from being done.”175 Using their equitable powers,176 or 
express provisions of the Code,
177
 bankruptcy courts can interpret what was 
intended as a Production Payment or term overriding royalty as a disguised 
financing instrument.
178
 Although determining whether a Production 
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Payment is an executory contract or a disguised financing instrument is 
within the bankruptcy court’s power, it can have devastating effects on the 
evaluation of Production Payments. 
Recharacterization is the power of a bankruptcy court to examine the 
economic reality of an instrument and establish the true substance of the 
transaction.
179
 In the bankruptcy context, recharacterization is fact specific 
and determined “case-by-case.”180 Although recharacterization rarely takes 
places within the oil and gas context, the body of law that has developed in 
oil and gas transactions can help to understand how courts establish the true 
character of a transaction.  
Although there is a “strong presumption that a deed and lease . . . are 
what they purport to be,” a bankruptcy court can still find that the 
transaction is something other than a conveyance if certain factors are 
present.
181
 Bankruptcy courts will use various factors to determine the 
correct characterization of the transaction.
182
 The factors are similar to 
determining whether a transaction constitutes a true lease: (1) whether the 
transactions were rental payments or were structured to ensure or guarantee 
a return on an investment;
183
 (2) whether the purchase price related to fair 
market value or whether it was calculated as the amount necessary to 
finance the transaction;
184
 (3) whether the property was purchased for the 
lessee and not the lessor; and (4) whether the lessee assumed many of the 
obligations normally associated with ownership.
185
 
In sum, the “question for the court then is whether . . . the true nature of 
the transaction, [is] such that the legal rights and economic consequences of 
the agreement bear a greater similarity to a financing transaction or to a 
sale.”186 Although the Code facially intends to exclude Production 
Payments from the debtor’s estate, such payments still result in contested 
interpretations due to the absolute conveyance of oil and gas reserves and 
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an obligation to produce and deliver the Production Payments.
187
 In other 
words, the absolute conveyance of a Production Payment begins to look 
similar to a financing transaction or a loan. Because Production Payments 
risk being recharacterized, parties should avoid providing a court with the 
ability to recharacterize a transfer of Production Payments into a loan.  
In In re Senior-G & A Operating Co., an E&P company entered into a 
“Production Payment Loan Agreement” with an investor.188 The investor 
advanced $5.1 million to the E&P company in exchange for Production 
Payments.
189
 The E&P company filed bankruptcy and the bankruptcy 
trustee asserted that the investors were secured creditors and would need to 
pay certain costs with the maintenance and improvement of its collateral.
190
 
Investors denied that they were secured creditors and asserted they were 
owners of term overriding royalty interests who were receiving Production 
Payments.
191
 The Fifth Circuit found that, because the interest did not 
constitute a term overriding royalty, the investors were not owners.
192
 
Furthermore, the court relied on the instrument’s language to determine that 
the investors were secured creditors and that there was a lien on the 
hydrocarbons.
193
 The Fifth Circuit recharacterized the agreement to convey 
these interest into a loan. 
In In re ATP, the defendant, a lessee on the OCS, conveyed to the 
plaintiff, an investor of the defendant’s company, $700 million worth of 
term overriding royalty interests and net profit interests through sixteen 
agreements.
194
 The defendant argued that these transactions were “disguised 
financing” transactions and should be part of the bankruptcy estate.195 
Although the transactions were labeled unambiguously, the court analyzed 
the objective substance of the transaction.
196
 The court ultimately 
recharacterized the transactions as loans because of the high interest rate, 
the characteristics of a loan, the treatment of the conveyance as a loan for 
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tax purposes, and the production as artificial to payment.
197
 To the court, 
the terms were consistent with a disguised financing instrument.
198
 
Although state law establishes the nature of the interests, there are some 
precautions individuals can take to avoid a court recharacterizing a true sale 
as disguised financing. If the parties can effectuate a conveyance of real 
property, such transactions should avoid a relationship analysis as between 
a secured creditor and debtor.
199
 These secured creditor rights, such as a 
“lien and security interest secure only the . . . obligations under the 
purchase and sale agreement.”200 The benefit of conveying real property is 
that it segregates the provisions creating the secured creditor rights from the 
conveyance, “which will (hopefully) assist a court’s interpretation of the 
documents.”201 Moreover, there would be no language in the conveyance 
that would make investors a secured creditor, unlike in In re Senior-G & 
A.
202
 Although bankruptcy courts can use the “collapse doctrine” to collapse 
a “series of transactions and treat[] them as a single integrated transaction,” 
parties can minimize the risk of a court construing the transaction as a 
whole by containing the debtor-creditor rights within the final purchase and 
sale agreement.
203
  
Individuals looking to enter transactions with producers on the OCS 
should avoid the factors courts use to evaluate whether a conveyance of oil 
and gas interests is a loan.
204
 In structuring these transactions, individuals 
should not emphasize the return on investment and instead emphasize the 
fact that it is a purchase of Production Payments owed over a period of 
time.
205
 Structuring the transaction to avoid classification as a loan under 
tax law will help.
206
 Individuals should also be sure to describe specifically 
the Production Payments by volume or time instead of by revenue or total 
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price in order to distinguish their Production Payments from dollar 
dominated production payments (“DDPP”). Because “‘DDPP’ give the 
carved out interest owner the right to receive a fixed dollar amount 
generated from the property” they differ from Production Payments and are 
defined as “‘borrowings’ by the Financial Account Standards Board.”207 
However, the Financial Account Standards Board defines Production 
Payments as a “transfer of a mineral interest.”208 The differences are 
essential in determining how likely a court is to recharacterize the 
instrument. Thus, individuals interested in entering into transactions with 
producers on the OCS need to carefully structure and draft their 
transactions.  
2. Is the Individual Participating in the Operation? 
The second element to establish that a Production Payment does not 
enter the debtor’s estate under § 541(b) of the Code requires the buyer not 
to participate in the production or operation of the property from which the 
Production Payments are transferred from. The Code uses the terms 
“participate” and “operations,” but does not define them.209 Therefore, 
bankruptcy courts employ the plain meaning of the words, in which 
“participation” generally means “take part.”210 The term “operations,” 
within the context of oil and gas leases, means the “production of 
minerals.”211 
Determining if the operator participates in the operations is resolved by 
looking at the instrument and the parties’ conduct.212 For example, many 
agreements contain a provision that requires the grantee’s consent to enter 
into certain contracts.
213
 Additionally, this definition excludes Production 
Payments for service providers.
214
 How broadly a court reads the terms 
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“participate” and “operations,” will determine whether or not a grantee’s 
Production Payments are excluded from the debtor’s estate.215 That said, 
courts have yet to develop this issue fully.
216
 
Individuals who consider entering into transactions with producers on 
the OCS should not have a problem with this requirement. In ATP, the court 
recognized that the producer retained operational control and the counter-
party had no right to develop or operate the property.
217
 Because these 
operations are done on the OCS, the second requirement is easier to meet. 
However, if Offshore Support Vessels assist in production, this element 
would likely not be met, mainly because Offshore Support Vessels would 
assist in operations by participating and performing services.
218
  
3. Is it Subject to Inclusion Provisions of the Code? 
Part of the final requirement to exclude Production Payments from the 
debtor’s estate under § 541(b)(4)(B) is determining that the Production 
Payment would not be included in the debtor’s estate except by operation of 
§ 365 of the Code.
219
 As discussed supra, § 365 of the Code provides a 
debtor with certain powers regarding executory contracts and unexpired 
leases.
220
 This section allows a debtor to reject a contract, which breaches 
the obligation and provides the counter-party with a right to file for 
rejection damages, then making the counter-party a creditor.
221
 Section 
541(b)(4)(B) would prevent the debtor from attempting to reject the 
agreement to retain the hydrocarbons used for the Production Payments 
unless the debtor can show the existence of the required elements.  
However, debtors can also reject the instrument under principles of state 
law. The critical analysis is whether the interest conveyed is real or 
personal property. As discussed in Part III, if the oil and gas interests are 
real property, then there was an absolute and consummated conveyance out 
                                                                                                             
uncommon for one party to take a production payment as compensation while providing 
services on the property, sometimes even conducting operations.”). 
 215. See id. 
 216. See Pearson, supra note 199, at 19. 
 217. NGP Capital Res. Co. v. ATP Oil & Gas Corp. (In re ATP Oil & Gas Corp.), 
No.12-03443, 2014 WL 61408 at *11, *12 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2014). 
 218. See Robin Sebastian Koske Rose, Future Characteristics of Offshore Support 
Vessels 27-34 (Mar. 22, 2011) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology) (on file with Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (discussing the future 
possibilities of Offshore Support Vessels) https://perma.cc/XS7Y-SMBG. 
 219. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(4)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 220. § 365(b). 
 221. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
72 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
  
 
of the estate at the time of the transaction.
222
 As a result, the same analysis 
to determine if § 365 applies to oil and gas leases can be applied to 
Production Payments. Primarily, if the considered interest is an absolute 
conveyance of a real property interest, then it is not an executory contract 
and cannot be rejected.
223
 
OCSLA’s choice of law scheme means that individuals must verify that 
the applicable state law defines the Production Payment as real property. 
For example, an individual interested in negotiating with a company 
drilling on the OCS off the coast of Alaska, Alabama, or Mississippi will 
need to determine the nature of the property interest conveyed in an oil and 
gas instrument to determine if the state has unsettled law characterizing and 
defining the property interest. In Louisiana, there is a split in law regarding 
whether an oil and gas lease is an executory contract or an unexpired 
lease.
224
 Therefore, individuals interested in contracting with operators on 
the OCS adjacent to Louisiana would need to draft the intent of parties 
carefully.
225
 However, if the OCS lease is adjacent to Texas, the property 
interest is real property. Thus, the investor’s Productions Payment would 
remain the property of the investor in the event of bankruptcy and would 
not enter the debtor’s estate because it was an effective and consummated 
conveyance at the time of transaction.
226
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Nonetheless, recharacterization for these transactions is still possible 
under § 365 and other provisions of the Code.
227
 The issue is that transfers 
of Production Payments—and the context of their creation—do not fit 
neatly into every section of the Code. There is little predictability, because 
these transfers occur in the discretionary areas of the Code. To minimize 
the risk that a bankruptcy court will impose its own interpretation on an 
instrument, individuals should clearly structure their transaction as an 
absolute conveyance supporting a true sale rather than a loan in disguise. 
The context of a transaction is relevant to a court’s analysis and may be 
persuasive against finding a true sale. For example, an investment company 
that has entered into transactions with an operator and knows the operator 
may soon file for bankruptcy may seek to negotiate a new contract. If the 
instrument contains provisions that result in severe penalties for missed 
payments and allows for production from other operators, the resulting 
evidence suggests the investment company intends to take advantage of the 
soon-to-be-bankrupt operator. In other words, the investment company is 
forcing the operator to convey the rest of the soon-to-be debtor’s property, 
leaving nothing for creditors. Bankruptcy courts will view this as a 
disguised loan and recharacterize the transaction. However, the cyclical 
nature of the oil and gas industry can disguise when a company is in true 
distress. The new contract may not have been predicated on potential 
bankruptcy at all, yet it may appear so to the bankruptcy court. Therefore, it 
makes it difficult to know when the transaction is disguised financing. 
Some have opined that the OCS is only for “big players,” but this 
observation could reflect the difficulty smaller players face trying to receive 
the capital needed to produce.
228
 Production Payments generally allow 
                                                                                                             
 227. The following cases represent examples of courts applying their recharacterization 
power. Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 
455 (3d Cir. 2006), Fairchild Dormier GHMB v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In 
re Dornier Aviation (N. Am.) Inc.), 453 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2006) (both courts 
authorizing judicial recharacterization under §105(a)); City of S.F. Mkt. Corp. v. Walsh (In 
re Moreggia & Sons, Inc.), 852 F.2d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Our analysis of the Code 
and the legislative history and purpose of section 365(d)(4) convinces us that the appropriate 
focus is on the federal law purposes of Section 365(d)(4) and the economic realities of this 
particular arrangement.”); Liona Corp. v. PCH Assocs. (In re PCH Assocs.), 804 F.2d 193, 
198 (2d Cir. 1986) (“As discussed below, the legislative history of section 502(b)(6) of the 
Code mandates that a court look beyond mere form to the circumstances of each case, 
including the economic substance of the transaction, to determine whether a ‘true lease’ 
exists for purposes of the Code.”). 
 228. Jordan Blum, Ensco buying Houston's Atwood Oceanics, HOUS. CHRONICLE (May 
30, 2017), https://perma.cc/H242-NUGW.  
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companies to become “big players,” but the OCS seems to restrict potential 
“big players” by preventing them from capitalizing on their production.229 
Therefore, the Code’s goal of incorporating every interest into the debtor’s 
estate potentially obstructs the development of oil and gas, with potential 
bankruptcies threatening the ownership rights of an investing party in its 
mineral interest. 
The benefits of becoming a fractional interest holder of production off 
the OCS comes with associated risks. The Code’s underlying policy of 
creating an expansive debtor’s estate, arguably for the benefit of creditors, 
may hurt an investor’s incentive to finance future projects on the OCS. If 
the absolute conveyances are characterized as loans, bankruptcy 
proceedings could eliminate their financial interests. 
V. Conclusion 
Although varying results in bankruptcy may make investors wary of 
entering into oil and gas conveyances via Production Payments or term 
overriding royalty transactions, case law interpretation and the Code 
provide a road map of the risks associated with such transactions between 
producers and investors. The OCS is the second largest production region in 
the nation, and it may continue to grow. Those looking to produce on the 
OCS will need financing. Production Payments are an excellent way to 
invest in companies, and more significant investment opportunities lead to 
enhanced competition and better production of domestic resources. With 
increased production in the OCS in the coming years, the opportunities to 
invest will be greater, so long as the parties can mitigate the bankruptcy 
risks.  
Parties need to take proper precautions when entering murky and 
uncharted waters of the OCS, notwithstanding the inherent risks of the oil 
and gas industry. The issues concerning OCS leases and transactions make 
it difficult for the smaller E&P companies to prosper, so investors should be 
mindful of minimizing the risk of a bankruptcy court recharacterizing a 
purchase into a loan.  
 
                                                                                                             
 229. See Nerijus Adomaitis, Out of bankruptcy, Seadrill eyes closer ties with oil service 
firms, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/8FB2-DJJZ; see also Hyperdynamics files 
for bankruptcy, OFFSHOREENERGYTODAY.COM (Dec. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/T4MF-
UQD6. 
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